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Regulators require banks to maintain capital above a certain level in order to 
correct the incentives to make excessively risky loans. However, it has never been 
clear how regulators determine how high or low the minimum capital–asset ratio 
should be. An examination of US regulators’ justifications for five regulations is-
sued over more than thirty years reveals that regulators have never performed a 
serious economic analysis that would justify the levels that they have chosen. In-
stead, regulators appear to have followed a practice of incremental change de-
signed to weed out a handful of outlier banks. This approach resulted in signifi-
cant regulatory failures leading up to the financial crisis of 2007–2008. 
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the central concepts in banking regulation is capital 
adequacy. Capital adequacy refers to the extent to which the as-
sets of a bank exceed its liabilities, and it is thus a measure of the 
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ability of the bank to withstand a financial loss. Bank regulators 
care about capital adequacy because their mandate is to prevent 
bank panics and contagions. A bank with a high ratio of capital 
to assets will, all else equal, be better able to withstand a sud-
den loss than a bank with a low capital–asset ratio. As a result, 
a well-capitalized bank is less likely to be thrown into insolvency 
or subjected to a run.1 
Financial regulators have always focused on capital adequa-
cy, but regulations have evolved considerably over the years. 
From World War II until the early 1980s, regulators treated capital 
adequacy as just one factor in their evaluations of the overall 
health of a bank. They did not formulate specific capital-
adequacy rules—such as minimum ratios—and different regula-
tors used different definitions of capital adequacy.2 In response 
to problems in the banking system in the 1970s, regulators be-
gan to think about capital adequacy more carefully. This led to 
four related developments in the early 1980s. First, regulators 
developed specific capital-adequacy rules to replace the vague 
standards under which capital adequacy was treated as just one 
factor among many. Second, regulators developed more-specific 
definitions of capital adequacy. Third, over time, regulators 
adopted increasingly strict minimum capital–asset ratios. 
Fourth, the different bank regulators began to coordinate their 
approaches to regulating capital.3 
These developments were related. Rules were used to spur 
banks to raise capital, but the process of drafting rules required 
regulators to think carefully about how to treat different types of 
assets and liabilities for the purpose of determining capital–
asset requirements. And as regulators moved from vague stand-
ards to bright-line rules, inconsistencies among their approaches 
became too obvious to ignore. Because banks can, within limits, 
move from one regulator to another by rechartering, regulators 
face pressures to act consistently.4 
 
 1 The theory and mechanics of capital regulation can be found in any textbook on 
banking. See generally, for example, Frederic S. Mishkin, The Economics of Money, 
Banking, and Financial Markets (Pearson 10th ed 2012). 
 2 See Part II.A. 
 3 See Part II.B. 
 4 See Jonathan R. Macey, Regulatory Competition in the US Federal System: 
Banking and Financial Services, in Daniel C. Esty and Damien Geradin, eds, Regulatory 
Competition and Economic Integration: Comparative Perspectives 95, 100–03 (Oxford 
2001) (describing the operation of the banking regulatory system within the framework of 
federalism and recognizing the trend toward a nationalized consistency in regulations). 
02 POSNER_ART_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/12/2015  2:30 PM 
2015] Capital-Adequacy Requirements 1855 
 
A further consequence of the move to rule-based regulations 
is that it became necessary for regulators to provide public justi-
fications for the rules that they had adopted. As we will see, 
most of these justifications were terse, opaque, and laden with 
boilerplate language.5 As a result, the reasoning behind those 
rules was unclear. The only clear idea that emerges from an ex-
amination of the regulatory documents is that the regulators be-
lieved that the regulations would affect very few banks—on the 
order of 5 percent or less.6 Thus, a major theme that emerges is 
that regulators defended their regulations in part on the 
grounds that those regulations did not inflict costs on most 
banks. 
While most regulatory agencies in the executive branch are 
required to issue cost-benefit analyses along with regulations,7 
the bank regulators rarely did so, and the cost-benefit analyses 
that they did issue were badly executed.8 Only in 2011 was a 
high-quality cost-benefit analysis prepared—by an international 
organization, not by US regulators. It showed that capital re-
quirements should have been much higher than they ever had 
been.9 Most economists appear to share this view, and many 
commentators have blamed the financial crisis of 2007–2008 on 
the inadequate capitalization of banks.10 Accordingly, the history 
of capital-adequacy regulation raises an interesting possibility: 
if bank regulators had used cost-benefit analysis from the start, 
the 2007–2008 financial crisis might not have taken place or 
(more likely) might have been less severe. 
If bank regulators did not engage in cost-benefit analysis, 
what decision procedures did they use to formulate capital-
adequacy requirements? I argue that the best theory for the 
regulators’ choices is what I call “norming.” “Norming,” as I use 
the term, means choosing a regulatory standard that permits 
the mean or modal behavior of regulated entities, a process that 
rules out outliers only at the low end. As a consequence, 
norming imposes zero cost on most banks and requires a change 
of behavior in only the weakest banks, which must either raise 
capital or go out of business. 
 
 5 See Part III.A. 
 6 See text accompanying notes 117–18. 
 7 See generally Executive Order 13563, 3 CFR 215. 
 8 See text accompanying notes 145–50. 
 9 See text accompanying notes 122–30. 
 10 See, for example, Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig, The Bankers’ New Clothes: 
What’s Wrong with Banking and What to Do about It 4–13 (Princeton 2013).  
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After describing the process of norming in bank regulation, I 
discuss why it might have been an attractive approach for bank 
regulators. Norming is a restrained style of regulation that 
causes no harm to most regulated entities and thus minimizes 
political opposition to the regulation. Indeed, norming may bene-
fit most regulated entities by eliminating competitors. For just 
this reason, norming is a highly questionable approach to regu-
lation, since regulation is supposed to counter the externalities 
that the average regulated entity imposes. 
If this is true, then the case for cost-benefit analysis of fi-
nancial regulations is stronger than its critics acknowledge.11 
This argument should also help put to rest the claim that cost-
benefit analysis is inherently deregulatory—a claim that has fre-
quently been made by critics of cost-benefit analysis, who blame it 
for undermining environmental, health, and safety regulations.12 
The plan is as follows. In Part I, I provide some background 
on capital-adequacy regulations, which are designed to counter a 
market failure that is associated with financial intermediation, 
the major economic function of banks. In Part II, I describe the 
history of those regulations, including the justifications that 
regulators provided for them and those regulations’ effects on 
the behavior of banks. I focus on the major changes to those reg-
ulations, which took place in 1981, 1985, 1989, 2007, and 2013. 
An important theme of this discussion is that regulators be-
lieved that the capital regulations before 2013 would not affect 
most banks; evidence suggests that their belief was correct. 
Although capital–asset ratios gradually rose over the decades, ev-
idence suggests that they rose in response to market forces rather 
 
 11  See generally, for example, John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial 
Regulation: Case Studies and Implications, 124 Yale L J 882 (2015) (criticizing cost-
benefit analysis of financial regulation); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Empty Call for Cost-
Benefit Analysis in Financial Regulation, 43 J Legal Stud S351 (2014) (same). For de-
fenses of cost-benefit analysis of financial regulation, see generally Eric A. Posner and E. 
Glen Weyl, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulations: A Response to Criticisms, 124 
Yale L J F 246 (2015) (responding to counterarguments by Professors John C. Coates IV 
and Jeffrey N. Gordon that cost-benefit analysis is undesirable for financial regulations 
because of valuation difficulties); Eric A. Posner and E. Glen Weyl, Benefit-Cost Para-
digms in Financial Regulation, 43 J Legal Stud S1 (2014); Eric Posner and E. Glen Weyl, 
Benefit-Cost Analysis for Financial Regulation, 103 Am Econ Rev Papers & Proceedings 
393 (2013). 
 12 See generally, for example, Thomas O. McGarity, Freedom to Harm: The Lasting 
Legacy of the Laissez Faire Revival (Yale 2013); Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling, 
Priceless: On Knowing the Price of Everything and the Value of Nothing (New Press 2005). 
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than to the regulations.13 In Part III, I discuss more broadly the 
advantages and disadvantages of norming as a strategy for regu-
lating the financial industry. Norming can in theory be given a 
policy justification, but a better explanation is that it serves as 
an excuse for regulatory failure in the face of entrenched indus-
try opposition. 
I.  CAPITAL-ADEQUACY REGULATIONS: THEIR PURPOSE AND 
STRUCTURE 
The theory of bank regulation is based on the risks that 
banks pose to the economy. Banks are financial intermediaries 
that are characterized by a liquidity mismatch between the as-
set and liability sides of the balance sheet. On the asset side, 
banks usually hold a large number of long-term, customized 
loans. If the bank must quickly raise capital, it can sell these 
loans—but because the loans are illiquid, the bank will have to 
sell them at a deep discount from their face value.14 Consider a 
$100,000 five-year loan to an automaker, or a $200,000 thirty-
year mortgage to a homeowner. These loans are unique prod-
ucts. The market value of each loan—the price that a third party 
will pay for it—is a function of many variables, including the 
probability that the loan will be paid in full, as well as the value 
of underlying assets in case it is not. The probability that the 
automaker will pay its loan depends on all kinds of factors—how 
good management is, for example. The probability that the 
mortgage will be paid depends on the income, honesty, and com-
petence of the borrower and on the value of the asset at the time 
of default if default strikes. The bank possesses inside infor-
mation about these factors that is not accessible to potential 
buyers. The buyers will need to satisfy themselves by investigat-
ing the loans—but that takes time, so if the bank needs to sell 
the loans quickly, it can do so only at a discount. 
On the liability side, banks typically are liable for a large 
amount of highly liquid debt—above all, demand deposits (that 
is, checking accounts). Customers lend money to the bank by 
 
 13 See Franklin Allen, Elena Carletti, and Robert Marquez, Credit Market Competi-
tion and Capital Regulation, 24 Rev Fin Stud 983, 983–84 (2011) (explaining that banks 
may raise capital to reduce the cost of debt when creditors worry that the banks are too 
risky).  
 14 See Rustom M. Irani and Ralf R. Meisenzahl, Loan Sales and Bank Liquidity 
Management: Evidence from a U.S. Credit Register *28 (unpublished manuscript, June 3, 
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/BXT4-JUHR. 
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depositing cash, checks, or other financial instruments, and 
these customers have the right to withdraw any or all of their 
money at any time without notice. Normally, customers with-
draw money at about the same rate that they deposit it, so the 
pool of liquid liability remains constant. This means that the 
bank can safely lend out this money in the form of illiquid loans. 
But from time to time, customers may withdraw their money en 
masse, causing a run on the bank. They may do so because of a 
severe economic downturn, rumors about the bank’s solvency, or 
other random factors. If a run starts, the bank has few choices. 
It can sell off assets at a discount, but it then risks insolvency. 
Alternatively, it may be able to borrow from another bank long 
enough to reassure customers. But either way, there is a good 
chance that the bank will fail. 
A bank failure by itself is not necessarily a problem that 
calls for government intervention. In principle, depositors and 
other creditors will be compensated for the risk of bank failure 
in the form of interest and other consideration.15 Bank failure is 
a problem for the government because of the risk of contagion.16 
Banks lend money to each other, so if one bank fails, other 
banks may fail as well. If many banks fail, then businesses that 
depend on credit (as most do) will have trouble obtaining it, and 
many of those businesses will fail, throwing employees out of 
work.17 While in principle investors could create new banks to 
replace the old ones, or surviving banks could expand their lend-
ing to compensate for bank failures, the collapse of existing 
banks will result in the destruction of nonrecoverable value be-
cause information about borrowers will be lost and relationships 
will be destroyed.18 Consumers will also be unable to borrow in 
order to finance their purchases of houses, cars, and other items, 
which will further exacerbate the economic downturn. Moreover, 
banks play a vital role in the payments system, so widespread 
bank collapses will interfere with the transmission of money 
 
 15 This statement does not apply to depositors who receive insurance, an issue to 
which I return below. See text accompanying notes 25–29. 
 16 See Douglas W. Diamond and Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, 
and Liquidity, 91 J Polit Econ 401, 415 (1983). 
 17 See Brett McDonnell, Don’t Panic! Defending Cowardly Interventions during and 
after a Financial Crisis, 116 Penn St L Rev 1, 8–9 (2011). 
 18 See generally Ben S. Bernanke, Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in 
the Propagation of the Great Depression, 73 Am Econ Rev 257 (1983). 
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from one person to another. In this way, a financial crisis can 
cause a general economic collapse.19 
Bank failures occur in many ways, and not just through the 
classic runs by depositors. During the financial crisis of 2007–
2008, the major type of asset that caused problems was not cus-
tomized loans but collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).20 While 
CDOs were designed to be tradable, and hence liquid, problems 
arose because of their immense complexity. Their value was tied 
to thousands of underlying mortgages. When housing prices 
started to decline, investors discovered that their assumptions 
about the value of the underlying mortgages, and therefore 
about the value of the CDOs, were incorrect, and so they could 
no longer accurately determine the value of the CDOs.21 Banks 
thus could not sell their CDOs to raise cash except at huge dis-
counts. Meanwhile, many large banks obtained financing 
through the repo market, in which they offered CDOs and other 
securities as collateral for short-term (one- or two-day) loans 
from pension funds and other large institutions.22 The lenders 
stopped accepting CDOs as collateral (or required increasingly 
larger haircuts), and thus the banks could no longer borrow in 
short-term markets.23 If forced to sell off CDOs at prevailing 
panic-driven prices, the banks would have been driven into in-
solvency (as some were).24 
To prevent or mitigate financial panics, the government of-
fers two types of insurance. First, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) protects depositors up to $250,000.25 Second, 
the Federal Reserve (“the Fed”) stands as the lender of last re-
sort and provides loans to any bank (as well as to other types of 
financial institutions) that suffers a run during a financial cri-
sis.26 Although only FDIC insurance is given the formal name of 
“insurance,” lender-of-last-resort lending is functionally insurance 
 
 19 See McDonnell, 116 Penn St L Rev at 8–9 (cited in note 17). 
 20 See James Crotty, Structural Causes of the Global Financial Crisis: A Critical 
Assessment of the ‘New Financial Architecture’, 33 Camb J Econ 563, 566–70 (2009). 
 21 See id.  
 22 See Zachary J. Gubler, Regulating in the Shadows: Systemic Moral Hazard and 
the Problem of the Twenty-First Century Bank Run, 63 Ala L Rev 221, 237–39 (2012). 
 23 See id at 240–41. 
 24 See, for example, Gary B. Gorton, Slapped by the Invisible Hand: The Panic of 
2007 125–33 (Oxford 2010) (discussing the panic-driven pricing of CDOs and its effects 
on bank solvency). Note that many of the institutions caught in this squeeze were in-
vestment banks rather than commercial banks. 
 25 12 USC § 1821(a)(1)(E). 
 26 See 12 USC § 347a. 
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as well. Insurance should discourage depositors from withdraw-
ing money, and other creditors from failing to roll over short-
term loans, based on false rumors or worries about the economy; 
but it also suppresses creditors’ incentives to monitor banks and 
to ensure that banks are safe before lending to them.27 Thus, 
both types of insurance give banks an incentive (specifically, a 
moral hazard) to make risky loans and other investments.28 
Banks enjoy all the upside, while the downside is absorbed at 
least partly by the government insurance system.29 
Even if deposit insurance and emergency lending did not 
create perverse incentives, banks would still have incentives to 
take excessive risks by maintaining too-little capital relative to 
the social optimum, given their portfolio of assets. The reason is 
that a bank and its creditors (to the extent that creditors are 
able to engage in adequate monitoring of bank risk taking) do 
not take into account the costs of a bank’s failure to other banks 
in the financial system. If one bank fails, then creditors of a sec-
ond bank may run because they believe that the second bank 
has made loans to the first bank and will be unable to recover 
them; or creditors may fear that whatever caused the first bank 
to fail (such as adverse economic conditions) will also cause the 
second bank to fail.30 If panic spreads and contagion results, a 
general financial crisis will occur that will harm not only bank 
shareholders and creditors but also people who would benefit 
from borrowing but who, as a result of the loss of liquidity 
throughout the system, can no longer borrow. 
Bank regulation tries to counter these incentives. Its overall 
purpose is to ensure that banks operate in a “safe and sound” 
way. This means that banks are not permitted to take excessive 
risks. Regulation takes many forms: The FDIC charges a higher 
premium to risky banks.31 Bank regulators also limit the lines of 
 
 27 See Peter P. Swire, Bank Insolvency Law Now That It Matters Again, 42 Duke L 
J 464, 514–15 (1992). 
 28 See id at 499. 
 29 There is extensive literature on the lender-of-last-resort function of central 
banks. For an overview, see generally Charles Goodhart and Gerhard Illing, eds, Finan-
cial Crises, Contagion, and the Lender of Last Resort: A Reader (Oxford 2002). 
 30 See Philippe Aghion, Patrick Bolton, and Mathias Dewatripont, Contagious Bank 
Failures in a Free Banking System, 44 Eur Econ Rev 713, 718 (2000). 
 31 See 12 CFR §§ 327.4, 327.9. Most academics believe that the FDIC does not price 
risk accurately. See, for example, Viral V. Acharya, João A.C. Santos, and Tanju 
Yorulmazer, Systemic Risk and Deposit Insurance Premiums, 16 Fed Res Bank NY Econ 
Pol Rev 89, 90–92 (Aug 2010) (describing the ways that FDIC insurance falls short of 
providing banks with optimal incentives). 
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business that banks may enter, the size of loans, and so on.32 
But the focus of all these efforts is the capital–asset ratio. Gen-
erally speaking, banks with high capital–asset ratios are given 
more freedom to manage their portfolios than other banks. 
Banks with low capital–asset ratios may be shut down. 
To understand the significance of the capital–asset ratio, 
consider the hypothetical bank balance sheet in Figure 1. 
FIGURE 1.  A HYPOTHETICAL BANK BALANCE SHEET 
Assets Liabilities 
$100 in loans $95 in demand deposits $5 in common equity 
 
 This bank is solvent because its assets are worth more than 
its liabilities. The capital–asset ratio is 5 percent ($5 / $100), 
which tells the regulator that if the value of the assets declines 
by more than 5 percent, the bank will become insolvent. Thus, 
the capital–asset ratio is a measure of how robust a bank is 
against market shocks. Suppose, for example, that interest rates 
rise, with the result that the value of the bank’s loan portfolio 
falls to $98. Now the bank has equity of $3 ($98 − $95), and its 
capital–asset ratio is just over 3 percent ($3 / $98). The regulator 
would likely demand that the bank raise capital by issuing new 
shares to investors. If investors pay $4 for new shares, the bank 
now has assets of $102 ($98 plus $4 in cash from the investors), 
equity of $7 ($102 − $95), and a healthy capital–asset ratio of 
almost 7 percent ($7 / $102). 
The major effect of a high level of capital relative to assets is 
to reduce the incentive to take risks.33 If a bank has very low eq-
uity, its shareholders have little to lose by taking risks. If the 
risks turn out well, the shareholders make a profit; if they do 
not, the bank’s creditors (and the government) absorb the loss. 
By requiring banks to issue more capital, the government puts 
 
 32 See, for example, 12 CFR § 32.1 (prohibiting “excessive loans to one person, or to 
related persons that are financially dependent”). 
 33 Higher capital also increases bank performance during a financial crisis and de-
creases the possibility of bank failure. See Allen N. Berger and Christa H.S. Bouwman, 
How Does Capital Affect Bank Performance during Financial Crises?, 109 J Fin Econ 
146, 149–50 (2013). 
02 POSNER_ART_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/12/2015  2:30 PM 
1862  The University of Chicago Law Review [82:1853 
   
more of the risk on the shareholders. If investments go sour, the 
shareholders lose more money.34 
How high capital ratios should be is a complex question. 
Some scholars believe that they should be very high—as high as 
50 percent.35 Their reasons are derived from the Modigliani-
Miller theorem, which provides that the value of a firm is inde-
pendent of its mix of debt and equity.36 If this theorem is correct, 
then there is no economic cost from forcing banks to issue equity 
rather than debt. Banks issue much more debt than ordinary 
firms, and the likely explanation is that the debt is implicitly 
subsidized by the government. However, the Modigliani-Miller 
theorem is an abstraction—a useful starting point for thinking 
about capital structure, not a description of the world. Among 
other things, it assumes (counterfactually) the absence of taxes, 
zero costs from bankruptcy, and an efficient capital market.37 In 
the real world, there may well be costs from raising equity ra-
ther than debt.38 In addition, people obviously value demand de-
posits; if banks were required to issue huge amounts of equity, 
then checking accounts would become scarcer and more expen-
sive.39 The magnitude of these costs is an empirical question. 
 
 34 For a lucid exposition, see Admati and Hellwig, The Bankers’ New Clothes at 108 
(cited in note 10). For an in-depth analysis of this issue, see generally Anat R. Admati, et 
al, Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why 
Bank Equity Is Not Socially Expensive (Rock Center for Corporate Governance Working 
Paper Series, Oct 22, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/VSY2-H2ZN. 
 35 See, for example, John H. Cochrane, The More Bank Capital, the Safer the Bank 
(Wall St J, July 15, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/2EUK-KEG7; John Cassidy, Inter-
view with Eugene Fama (New Yorker, Jan 13, 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/9XRT 
-EC9V; Admati and Hellwig, The Bankers’ New Clothes at 166 (cited in note 10) (arguing 
that “all the arguments made against much higher equity requirements [are] false or 
flawed”). 
 36 Franco Modigliani and Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Fi-
nance and the Theory of Investment, 48 Am Econ Rev 261, 268 (1958). 
 37 Id. 
 38 A standard view is that debt may have value for corporate governance purposes. 
See generally, for example, Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, Theory of the 
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J Fin Econ 305 
(1976). Another view is that issuing equity can be a negative signal of a firm’s financial 
health. See, for example, Stewart C. Myers and Nicholas S. Majluf, Corporate Financing 
and Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have, 13 
J Fin Econ 187, 208 (1984).  
 39 See Harry DeAngelo and René M. Stulz, Liquid-Claim Production, Risk Man-
agement and Bank Capital Structure: Why High Leverage Is Optimal for Banks *37 
(Fisher College of Business Working Paper Series, Oct 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/78VQ-W7EG (explaining that “social costs can arise if mandated reduc-
tions in bank leverage are satisfied by a reduction in the supply of deposit debt or other so-
cially valuable liquid claims”). For discussion and criticism of Professors Harry DeAngelo 
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Nonetheless, many economists have converged on the view 
that high capital–asset ratios would be socially beneficial.40 But 
this raises an additional set of issues regarding how exactly the 
ratio should be defined. First, not all assets are the same: some 
loans are riskier than others. When market conditions decline, 
risky loans may default while safe loans do not. Regulators want 
to distinguish banks with risky loans from banks with safe loans 
because banks with risky loans are more likely to collapse in re-
sponse to adverse market conditions even if both types of banks 
have the same capital–asset ratios. Another way to see this is to 
note that banks could undermine the effects of a higher capital 
requirement by selling low-risk assets and replacing them with 
high-risk assets.41 To prevent banks from doing this, one must 
adjust the ratios for the quality of the assets. Regulators use a 
system of risk weighting, which is discussed below.42 
Second, not all debt is the same. Demand deposits pose a 
threat to banks because depositors can withdraw their money 
quickly and without notice, depleting the cash reserves of the 
bank and possibly forcing it to sell illiquid assets at fire-sale 
prices or to pay a high interest rate for an emergency loan from 
another bank or from the Fed. Long-term debt is less risky for a 
bank because the bank can gradually sell assets to meet obliga-
tions as they become due. Other forms of debt and quasi debt, 
like preferred equity, are also less risky because they become 
due only if there are ample resources to pay short-term debt. Be-
cause the simple capital–asset ratio does not distinguish among 
 
and René M. Stulz’s work, see Admati, et al, Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths at 
*37–43 (cited in note 34). 
 40 See, for example, Admati and Hellwig, The Bankers’ New Clothes at 166 (cited in 
note 10); Roger B. Myerson, Rethinking the Principles of Bank Regulation: A Review of 
Admati and Hellwig’s The Bankers’ New Clothes, 52 J Econ Lit 197, 209 (2014); Gary B. 
Gorton, Misunderstanding Financial Crises: Why We Don’t See Them Coming 151 
(Oxford 2012); Mathias Dewatripont, Jean-Charles Rochet, and Jean Tirole, Balancing 
the Banks: Global Lessons from the Financial Crisis 96 (Princeton 2010); Darrell Duffie, 
How Big Banks Fail and What to Do about It 55 (Princeton 2010); Heidi M. Schooner and 
Michael W. Taylor, Global Bank Regulation: Principles and Policies 132–35 (Academic 
2010). But see James R. Barth, Gerard Caprio, and Ross Levine, Guardians of Finance: 
Making Regulators Work for Us 180 (MIT 2012) (“[A] system based on imposing required 
capital ratios . . . not only encourages shadow banking, but raising those capital re-
quirements . . . increases the incentives for banks to move risky assets into off-balance 
sheet entities.”). 
 41 See Daesik Kim and Anthony M. Santomero, Risk in Banking and Capital Regu-
lation, 43 J Fin 1219, 1231 (1988) (noting that capital ratio regulation by itself is insuffi-
cient to control bank insolvency because it allows banks to “circumvent the restrictions 
via financial leverage and/or business risk”). 
 42 See text accompanying notes 73–77. 
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different types of debt and equity, it can give a misleading im-
pression of the vulnerability of banks with different capital 
structures. Regulators address this problem by allowing banks 
to treat the safest forms of debt as equity for purposes of calcu-
lating the capital–asset ratio under some circumstances.43 
Third, the simple capital–asset ratio disregards off–balance 
sheet obligations, like loan commitments and standby letters of 
credit. Suppose that the bank in Figure 1 enters into a contract 
with a customer to issue a $20 loan to the customer one year 
from today. That loan will not appear on the balance sheet until 
it is issued. When it does, the bank’s capital–asset ratio may 
fall, depending on how the bank raises capital to make that loan. 
A bank with many loan commitments is thus riskier than a 
bank without them, yet this difference will not appear in banks’ 
capital–asset ratios. Regulators have addressed this problem by 
requiring banks to translate off–balance sheet commitments into 
appropriately weighted liabilities for purposes of calculating 
capital–asset ratios.44 
In sum, financial intermediation causes negative externali-
ties in the form of systemic risk. Government insurance helps 
mitigate the risk of a financial panic but also creates a moral 
hazard. Capital regulation counters both this moral hazard and 
the excessive level of risk taking that is inherent in financial in-
termediation. But while there is little debate that capital re-
quirements are the appropriate regulatory response as a matter 
of theory, economists have debated the level and the form of op-
timal capital requirements. 
II.  THE HISTORY OF CAPITAL-ADEQUACY REGULATION BY US 
REGULATORS 
In this Part, I provide a brief and necessarily incomplete 
history of capital-adequacy regulation.45 To keep this Article 
within manageable bounds, I disregard state regulation of 
banks, federal regulation of financial institutions other than 
 
 43 For a discussion of this type of treatment, known as Tier 2 capital, see Risk 
Management Manual of Examination Policies § 2.1-4 to -5 (FDIC, Apr 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/V499-AW2X. 
 44 For a discussion of these weighted liabilities, known as “risk-weighted assets,” 
see Heath Price Tarbert, Are International Capital Adequacy Rules Adequate? The Basle 
Accord and Beyond, 148 U Pa L Rev 1771, 1812–13 (2000). 
 45 For a brief and useful overview of this history up to 1988, see generally Malcolm 
C. Alfriend, International Risk-Based Capital Standard: History and Explanation, 74 
Fed Res Bank Richmond Econ Rev 28 (Nov/Dec 1988). 
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commercial banks, and regulation of bank-like institutions such 
as thrifts. Thus, I focus on federal regulation of commercial 
banks and hence emphasize the activities of the major federal 
bank regulators—the Fed, the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (OCC), and the FDIC. While the jurisdictions of these 
agencies overlap a great deal, generally speaking, the Fed regu-
lates bank holding companies and state banks that belong to the 
Federal Reserve System, the OCC regulates nationally char-
tered banks, and the FDIC regulates other state banks that are 
members of the FDIC.46  
A.  From World War II to the 1970s 
The period from World War II to the 1970s is a prehistory of 
capital-adequacy regulation. Financial regulators did not re-
quire banks to satisfy any specific minimum-capital rule. In-
stead, regulators applied a general “safety and soundness” 
standard to all banks.47 Capital adequacy was only one of many 
indicators that regulators looked at to determine whether a 
bank was healthy.48 Regulators considered the riskiness of as-
sets, the quality of management, earnings, and the size of the 
bank, among other things, and they then made an all-things-
considered judgment as to whether a bank was in regulatory 
compliance.49  
Because capital adequacy was just one factor among others 
used to generate an overall assessment of a bank’s financial 
health, regulators were not always specific about how they de-
fined the relevant components of the capital-adequacy ratio—
assets, liabilities, and so on—and they did not try very hard to 
coordinate with each other. As a result, each regulator applied a 
different standard to the banks under its jurisdiction.50 
The period from World War II until the late 1960s was one 
of unusual stability in the banking system. While regulatory su-
pervision no doubt played a role, the usual explanation is that 
the United States experienced low inflation and steady economic 
 
 46 See Mishkin, The Economics of Money at 250–51 (cited in note 1). 
 47 See Susan Burhouse, et al, Basel and the Evolution of Capital Regulation: Moving 
Forward, Looking Back (FDIC, Jan 14, 2003), archived at http://perma.cc/7Q68-9BT9. 
 48 See Alfriend, 74 Fed Res Bank Richmond Econ Rev at 29 (cited in note 45); 
Daniel K. Tarullo, Banking on Basel: The Future of International Financial Regulation 
29–35 (Peterson Institute for International Economics 2008). 
 49 See Alfriend, 74 Fed Res Bank Richmond Econ Rev at 29 (cited in note 45). 
 50 See Tarullo, Banking on Basel at 29–35 (cited in note 48). 
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growth.51 Banks were also barred from risky financial activities 
and protected from competition by heavy restrictions on branch-
ing, significant chartering requirements, and rules that barred 
them from charging a market interest rate on deposits.52 Thus, 
managers may have exercised caution because banks earned 
monopoly rents that they would lose if their banks failed. 
B. The Modern Regulatory Era 
In the late 1970s, the sleepy era of banking came to an end. 
High inflation and low economic growth squeezed banks.53 Be-
cause of high inflation, depositors demanded interest on depos-
its, but banks were limited in what they could offer. Because of 
low economic growth, demand for credit fell.54 Meanwhile, de-
regulation in the banking industry reduced the monopoly rents 
enjoyed by owners of bank charters. Notably, money market mu-
tual funds were allowed to offer interest in return for short-term 
deposits with checking privileges, and they attracted billions of 
dollars of deposits from banks.55 A number of banks failed dur-
ing this period, and the capital–asset ratios of most banks de-
clined.56 Alarmed by this turn of events, the Fed, the OCC, and 
the FDIC agreed to try to coordinate regulation in an attempt to 
reverse the decline of capital in the banking system. In 1981, they 
issued a (partially) coordinated rule governing capital adequacy.57 
One major feature of this rule was the division of capital 
into “primary” and “secondary” versions. Primary capital includ-
ed common stock, certain reserves, and preferred stock with suf-
ficiently long maturity. Secondary capital included other forms 
of preferred stock and subordinated debt.58 “Total capital” 
 
 51 See Charles W. Calomiris and Stephen H. Haber, Fragile by Design: The Political 
Origins of Banking Crises and Scarce Credit 194 (Princeton 2014) (discussing the accel-
erated price inflation that took place in the 1960s and 1970s). 
 52 See Banking Act of 1933 (“Glass-Steagall”) §§ 3, 5(b)–(c), 48 Stat 162, 163–66, 
codified as amended at 12 USC §§ 301, 304, 321, 333–36, 338. 
 53 See Donald Tomaskovic-Devey and Ken-Hou Lin, Financialization: Causes, Ine-
quality Consequences, and Policy Implications, 18 NC Banking Inst 167, 171 (Special 
Edition 2013). 
 54 Id at 171–72. 
 55 See Calomiris and Haber, Fragile by Design at 195–96 (cited in note 51). 
 56 See Burhouse, et al, Basel and the Evolution of Capital Regulation (cited in note 
47) (attributing the increased incidence of bank failures in the 1980s to worsened eco-
nomic conditions as well as bank risk profiles). 
 57 See generally Capital Adequacy Guidelines, 68 Fed Res Bull 33 (1982) (explain-
ing the Fed and the OCC’s policy); Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Statement of 
Policy on Capital Adequacy, 46 Fed Reg 62693 (1981) (explaining the FDIC’s policy). 
 58 See 68 Fed Res Bull at 34 (cited in note 57). 
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equaled primary capital plus secondary capital. The regulators 
also agreed to create separate rules for regional banks (assets 
between $1 billion and $15 billion)—which were large and diver-
sified—and community banks (assets below $1 billion).59 Table 1 
provides a summary.60 
TABLE 1.  MINIMUM-CAPITAL REGULATIONS (1981) 
 Regional  Banks 
Community 
Banks 
Primary-Capital Ratio (%) 5 6 
Total-Capital Ratio (%) 6.5 7 
 
Because regional banks were more diversified than commu-
nity banks, they were permitted a lower level of capital.61 Banks 
that fell below these floors were not shut down immediately but 
were instead subjected to increasingly greater obligations to 
manage risk and raise capital as their capital–asset ratios fell.62 
In 1983, Congress passed the International Lending Super-
vision Act63 (ILSA). This statute directed the banking regulators 
to “achieve and maintain adequate capital by establishing min-
imum levels of capital” for the banks that they regulate.64 ILSA 
was enacted in response to the Latin American debt crisis, 
which revealed that some US banks were dangerously exposed 
to risky foreign-sovereign debt.65 The law also put on firmer foot-
ing the regulators’ authority to issue capital-adequacy rules.66 
 
 59 Large multinational banks—those with assets greater than $15 billion—were 
subjected to a 5 percent floor in 1983. See Minimum Capital Guidelines: Amendments, 69 
Fed Res Bull 539, 539 (1983). 
 60 For the source of the information in Table 1, see 68 Fed Res Bull at 34 (cited in 
note 57). 
 61 See id at 33. 
 62 The FDIC used a slightly different system. It tried to take account of the riski-
ness of assets and the different types of equity, but otherwise the approach and numbers 
were similar. See 46 Fed Reg at 62694 (cited in note 57) (“When the adjusted equity cap-
ital ratio falls below this level, the Corporation will insist on a specific program for 
remedying the equity capital deficiency promptly.”). 
 63 Pub L No 98-181, 97 Stat 1278 (1983), codified in various sections of Title 12. 
 64 ILSA § 908(a)(1), 97 Stat at 1280, codified as amended at 12 USC § 3907(a)(1). 
 65 See Timothy Curry, The LDC Debt Crisis, in 1 History of the Eighties: Lessons for 
the Future; An Examination of the Banking Crises of the 1980s and Early 1990s 191, 
207–08 (FDIC 1997). 
 66 For an example of a pre-ILSA decision vacating an OCC order requiring a bank 
to raise capital, see First National Bank of Bellaire v Comptroller of the Currency, 697 
F2d 674, 687 (5th Cir 1983). 
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The regulators used this opportunity to simplify capital re-
quirements. The distinction between regional and community 
banks was discarded.67 Table 2 summarizes the new system.68  
TABLE 2.  MINIMUM-CAPITAL REGULATIONS (1985) 
Primary-Capital Ratio (%) 5.5 
Total-Capital Ratio (%) 6 
 
The regulators increased the primary-capital ratio for re-
gional banks from 5 percent to 5.5 percent, and they reduced it 
from 6 percent to 5.5 percent for community banks. The regula-
tors reduced the total-capital ratio for regional banks from 6.5 
percent to 6 percent, and for community banks from 7 percent to 
6 percent.69 
The next major round of changes took place starting in 
1989. The stimulus this time was the globalization of the finan-
cial system, which led to regulatory arbitrage—and a potential 
race to the bottom70—as large banks located offices and assets in 
countries with the weakest regulatory systems. The central banks 
of the G10 countries sent representatives to Basel, Switzerland, 
to hash out regulatory standards that would be acceptable to all. 
The result was the 1988 Basel Accord (“Basel I”), which regula-
tors agreed to apply to domestic banking systems.71 
In the United States, banking regulators implemented the 
new capital rules over several years (although for simplicity I 
 
 67 See ILSA § 908, 97 Stat at 1280–81, codified as amended at 12 USC § 3907. 
 68 See Seung Jung Lee and Viktors Stebunovs, Bank Capital Ratios and the Struc-
ture of Nonfinancial Industries *7–8 (Finance and Economics Discussion Series, Aug 14, 
2012), archived at http://perma.cc/3R5A-A99U. 
 69 See id at *8. 
 70 See Tarullo, Banking on Basel at 45–46 (cited in note 48) (“Basel I was motivated 
by two interacting concerns—the risk posed to the stability of the global financial system 
by low capital levels of internationally active banks and the competitive advantages ac-
cruing to banks subject to lower capital requirements.”). 
 71 See generally Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, International Conver-
gence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards (July 1988), archived at 
http://perma.cc/5NBP-2LLB. The focus of this Article is US regulation, so I discuss the 
Basel Accords only insofar as they intersect with my topic. There is a large literature on 
the Basel agreements. See generally, for example, Charles Goodhart, The Basel Commit-
tee on Banking Supervision: A History of the Early Years 1974–1997 (Cambridge 2011); 
Tarullo, Banking on Basel (cited in note 48). 
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call them “the 1989 regulations”).72 The 1989 regulations distin-
guished Tier 1 (instead of “primary”) and Tier 2 (instead of “sec-
ondary”) capital. While the definitions differed slightly, the de-
tails do not concern us.73 The regulations also created a risk-
weighting system for assets. Assets received a risk weight of 0, 
0.2, 0.5, or 1, with the safest assets (like US treasuries) receiv-
ing the lowest numbers and the riskiest assets (like ordinary 
loans) receiving the highest numbers.74 When calculating the 
denominator of the capital–asset ratio, the regulator would add 
together each asset multiplied by its risk weight. For example, a 
bank with $100 in US treasuries and $100 in regular loans 
would have risk-weighted assets of $100. A bank with no US 
treasuries and $200 in regular loans would have risk-weighted 
assets of $200. The higher denominators for the second bank 
with riskier assets would result in a lower capital–asset ratio. 
The minimums under these regulations are provided in Table 3.75 
TABLE 3.  MINIMUM-CAPITAL REGULATIONS (1989) 
Ratio 1990 1992 
Tier 1 (%) 3.25 4 
Tier 1 + Tier 2 (%) 7.25 8 
Tier 1 Leverage Ratio, Unweighted (%) 3 3 
 
The 1989 regulations phased in progressively stricter rules 
over several years, as shown in Table 3. They also introduced a 
separate minimum leverage ratio. The leverage ratio was the ra-
tio of Tier 1 equity to the sum of unweighted assets. It thus 
served as an additional cushion to ensure that a bank trying to 
game the risk-weighting system by accumulating low-weighted 
assets that were in fact relatively risky would nonetheless have 
sufficient capital. 
 
 72 See generally Federal Reserve System, Capital; Risk-Based Capital Guidelines, 
54 Fed Reg 4186 (1989); Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Risk-Based Capital 
Guidelines, 54 Fed Reg 4168 (1989); Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Capital 
Maintenance; Final Statement of Policy on Risk-Based Capital, 54 Fed Reg 11500 (1989). 
 73 Among other things, there was a limit to how much Tier 2 could be used in total 
capital. See generally Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Differences in Capital and 
Accounting Standards among the Federal Banking and Thrift Agencies; Report to Con-
gressional Committees, 55 Fed Reg 34339 (1990). 
 74 Id at 34341. 
 75 54 Fed Reg at 11516 (cited in note 72).  
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Basel I was regarded as excessively crude from the start.76 
Among other problems, the four-basket risk-weighting system 
bore little relationship to reality. Consider a bank that has 
loaned $100,000 to a family to buy a home and has bought 
$100,000 in municipal bonds. The mortgage will typically re-
ceive a risk weighting of 0.5, while the municipal bond invest-
ment will receive a risk weighting of 0.2. But it is highly unli-
kely that the mortgage is precisely 2.5 times riskier than the 
bond investment. The mortgage may well be exceptionally safe 
because the homeowner is wealthy and the value of the house is 
much greater than the loan. The bond investment may be risky 
because the city’s finances are in disarray. To address this prob-
lem, central bankers met in Basel again and reached a new 
agreement—known as Basel II—in 2004.77 
Basel II contained numerous innovations, most of which 
were never implemented by national regulators. Its most im-
portant legacy was the introduction of exemptions from the 
Basel I system for large, sophisticated banks, which were per-
mitted to use computer models to estimate their exposures to 
various types of risks.78 Regulators had actually permitted 
banks to use these models since the 1990s,79 but Basel II formal-
ized this approach. Banks had developed computer models that 
they used for internal risk management. These models used da-
ta from a bank’s lending business plus economic data to gener-
ate predictions about the bank’s financial position in response to 
various shocks—such as interest-rate spikes, sovereign-debt de-
faults, housing-price declines, and so on.80 In 2007, US regula-
tors implemented this new regime.81 
These rules were implemented just in time for the 2007–
2008 financial crisis, which revealed that banks were undercapi-
talized. In the wake of the crisis, central bankers repaired to 
 
 76 See Goodhart, The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision at 576 (cited in 
note 71). 
 77 See generally Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, International Conver-
gence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework (Bank for 
International Settlements, June 2004), archived at http://perma.cc/E2ZK-MGRU. 
 78 See Tarullo, Banking on Basel at 104–13 (cited in note 48). 
 79 Id at 88–89. 
 80 See Daniel A. Nuxoll, Internal Risk-Management Models as a Basis for Capital 
Requirements, 12 FDIC Banking Rev 18, 19–25 (1999). 
 81 See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, et al, Risk-Based Capital Stand-
ards: Advanced Capital Adequacy Framework — Basel II, 72 Fed Reg 69288, 69294 
(2007). The Tier 1 leverage ratio was increased to 4 percent in 2006. See id at 69289–94. 
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Basel to negotiate a new agreement (Basel III),82 and Congress 
passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Pro-
tection Act83 (“Dodd-Frank Act”). After the dust settled, the reg-
ulators issued the regulatory minimums presented in Table 4, 
which are based on Basel III.84 
TABLE 4.  MINIMUM-CAPITAL REGULATIONS (2013) 
Tier 1 (%) 6 
Tier 1 + Tier 2 (%) 8 
Tier 1 Leverage Ratio (%) 4 
Common-Equity Tier 1 (%) 4.5 
 
In addition to raising Tier 1, the 2013 regulations intro-
duced the common-equity Tier 1 category, which includes only 
common equity (hence excluding certain types of preferred equi-
ty in Tier 1). The 2013 capital rules also introduced a range of 
additional safeguards, including a capital-conservation buffer 
requirement that prohibits banks from issuing dividends when 
doing so would bring them too close to the capital floors. The 
buffer requirement effectively raises the capital requirement an-
other 2.5 percent.85 
And so we conclude our whirlwind tour of the history of capital-
adequacy regulation. Some caveats bear emphasis. I have sup-
pressed a large amount of detail and some variation among the 
regulators. Some of the rules in the tables above do not apply to 
certain types of banks or bank-related institutions; in particular, 
global systemically important financial institutions are governed 
 
 82 See generally Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel III: A Global Reg-
ulatory Framework for More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems (Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements, Dec 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/4GVC-D9GC. A revised ver-
sion of the agreement was released in June 2011. 
 83 Pub L No 111-203, 124 Stat 1376 (2010). For a critical view of the Dodd-Frank 
Act, see Viral V. Acharya and Matthew Richardson, Implications of the Dodd-Frank Act, 
4 Ann Rev Fin Econ 1, 31–33 (2012). 
 84 See generally Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System, Regulatory Capital Rules: Regulatory Capital, Im-
plementation of Basel III, Capital Adequacy, Transition Provisions, Prompt Corrective 
Action, Standardized Approach for Risk-Weighted Assets, Market Discipline and Disclo-
sure Requirements, Advanced Approaches Risk-Based Capital Rule, and Market Risk 
Capital Rule, 78 Fed Reg 62018 (2013). 
 85 See id at 62033. 
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by additional rules.86 Regulators phased in the rules over differ-
ent periods of time.87 They engaged in greater and lesser forms 
of regulatory forbearance toward banks that dipped close to the 
floors or even fell below them. Indeed, enforcement is a source of 
a great deal of variation, as regulators have the discretion to 
(and frequently do) demand that banks exceed capital require-
ments.88 Regulators amended their rules at various times in 
ways that I have skipped over. They no doubt used their judg-
ment in different ways in evaluating assets. But the overall pic-
ture should by now be roughly clear. 
III.  HOW DID REGULATORS CHOOSE (AND JUSTIFY) THE CAPITAL-
ADEQUACY RULES? 
A. The Regulators’ Explanations 
I turn now to the justifications that the regulators provided 
for the capital-adequacy rules and their revisions of those rules. 
At the start of the period under discussion, regulators provided 
hardly any justifications at all. The FDIC and the Fed (which 
was also acting on behalf of the OCC) issued cursory two-page 
statements announcing the 1981 regulations. These statements 
consisted of boilerplate language about the importance of objec-
tive and consistent standards for ensuring the financial health 
of banks, and they emphasized that capital adequacy would re-
main only one of a number of factors that regulators would eval-
uate.89 These statements did not explain why capital-adequacy 
rules were an appropriate approach to bank regulation, nor why 
the regulators chose the minimum capital levels that they did. 
The OCC, as a nonindependent regulatory agency, was sub-
ject to Executive Order 12291, which required regulatory agen-
cies in the executive branch to conduct cost-benefit analyses of 
all proposed “major rules”—those that are expected to have an 
 
 86 See Update of Group of Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) *2 
(Financial Stability Board, Nov 1, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/6YYU-LQF8. 
 87 See, for example, New Capital Rule Quick Reference Guide for Community Banks 
*2 (OCC, July 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/78FC-J9RS. 
 88 For a valuable empirical study of enforcement practices, see Julie Andersen Hill, 
Bank Capital Regulation by Enforcement: An Empirical Study, 87 Ind L J 645, 708 
(2012) (finding significant variation in the capital–asset ratios demanded by regulators 
in enforcement actions). 
 89 See generally 46 Fed Reg 62693 (cited in note 57); 68 Fed Res Bull 33 (cited in 
note 57). 
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economic impact of at least $100 million annually.90 The order 
did not extend to independent agencies like the Fed and the 
FDIC. The OCC addressed Executive Order 12291 in a separate 
document, in which it argued that a cost-benefit analysis of the 
capital-adequacy rule was not necessary, because the rule would 
not have an impact of $100 million or more per year.91 The rea-
son was that the effect of the regulation—to increase the book 
value of the aggregate capital of national banks by less than 5 
percent—represented “only a reclassification of already existing 
categories of funds.”92 It is not at all clear what this meant. 
The OCC also said that because the capital–asset ratios of 
national banks would increase as a result of the rule, banks 
would be able to “compete more aggressively for funds” and 
make larger loans to individual borrowers.93 Again, it is not clear 
what the OCC meant. It might have meant that banks with 
larger capital–asset ratios would be able to borrow at lower 
rates of interest and obtain economies of scale in lending; but if 
this were true, then banks would voluntarily improve their 
capital–asset ratios. The OCC did not acknowledge that the rule 
might impose costs on banks. 
In a later document, the Fed explained that the 1981 rules 
were driven by “[c]oncern about the decline in the ratio of capital 
to bank assets before 1981.”94 In the 1970s, the banking system 
experienced stress as a result of high inflation and low economic 
growth.95 A number of banks failed and the capital–asset ratio of 
the industry declined.96 Regulators decided that by incorporating 
capital standards into a rule, they would encourage banks to 
strengthen their balance sheets. But they did not explain the 
basis of the minimum capital levels that they chose. The bare 
fact that capital levels declined is not by itself cause for alarm: 
perhaps they were already too high relative to the social opti-
mum. Indeed, bank capital levels were significantly higher in 
 
 90 Executive Order 12291, 3 CFR 127, 127–28. 
 91 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Interpretive Rulings; National Banks; 
Definition of Capital, 48 Fed Reg 56359, 56363 (1983). 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Membership of State Bank-
ing Institutions; Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control; Capital 
Maintenance; Rules of Procedure, 50 Fed Reg 16057, 16057 (1985). 
 95 See generally Allan H. Meltzer, Origins of the Great Inflation, 87 Fed Res Bank 
St Louis Rev 145 (2005). 
 96 See Burhouse, et al, Basel and the Evolution of Capital Regulation (cited in 
note 47). 
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the nineteenth century than they are today;97 it may well be the 
case that capital levels can be allowed to decline as banks devel-
op more-sophisticated methods for minimizing risk or diversify-
ing their portfolios. 
In 1985, regulators revised the capital rules in response to 
ILSA, which ordered regulators to “cause banking institutions to 
achieve and maintain adequate capital by establishing mini-
mum levels of capital for such banking institutions and by using 
such other methods as the appropriate Federal banking agency 
deems appropriate.”98 ILSA was passed after the Latin American 
debt crisis, which revealed that some US banks were heavily ex-
posed to risky foreign debt.99 Congress accordingly endorsed the 
move toward capital-adequacy rules and also encouraged regula-
tors to strengthen them. 
Congress did not tell the regulators what the new capital 
requirements should be, leaving regulators with the discretion 
to pick specific numbers. The regulators did not explain why 
they chose 5.5 percent for primary capital and 6 percent for total 
capital, but they did note that the new levels would not affect 
most banks. As the Fed explained: 
Based on the most recent available data, only 17 state 
member banks and 61 bank holding companies with assets 
over $150 million have primary capital ratios (without de-
ducting intangible assets) below the 5.5 percent minimum 
primary capital guideline. Thus, fewer than 2 percent of all 
state member banks and 8 percent of all holding companies 
with assets over $150 million had primary capital ratios be-
low the minimum benchmark. With respect to total capital, 
25 state member banks and 80 bank holding companies 
have total capital ratios (without deducting intangibles) be-
low the 6.0 percent minimum guideline.100 
Similarly, the FDIC observed that “almost 96 percent of the 
banks in the nation [would not be] impacted by this regulation.”101 
 
 97 See Admati, et al, Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths at *6 n 12 (cited in 
note 34). 
 98 ILSA § 908(a)(1), 97 Stat at 1280, codified as amended at 12 USC § 3907(a)(1). 
 99 See Curry, The LDC Debt Crisis at 207–08 (cited in note 65). 
 100 50 Fed Reg at 16059 (cited in note 94). 
 101 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Capital Maintenance, 50 Fed Reg 11128, 
11130 (1985). 
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The OCC also emphasized that few of the national banks that it 
regulated would be affected by the new rules.102 
This time, the OCC conducted a cost-benefit analysis under 
Executive Order 12291.103 The OCC stated that 72 national 
banks had a shortfall of at least $1.8 billion in primary capital; 
66 of those banks, plus another 54, had a shortfall of at least 
$1.3 billion in secondary capital; and 389 banks met the mini-
mums but faced risks that required them to raise their capital 
ratios. These banks would thus incur underwriting costs of up to 
$185 million and in the meantime might need to reduce dividend 
payments.104 
This accounting of the costs is seriously deficient. The un-
derwriting costs are obviously trivial—this is just the cost of 
paying an investment bank to underwrite a stock offering. The 
reduction in dividends—that is, the lost profits—would be the 
major impact of the regulation, but the OCC did not estimate 
the reduction’s quantitative value. Thus, it failed to recognize 
most of the costs of the regulation. 
The OCC argued that the benefits of the regulation would 
be greater solvency for the banks, increased stability of the fi-
nancial system, and increased “capacity to fund economic 
growth.”105 The OCC did not estimate the value of these bene-
fits.106 Thus, although the OCC for the first time made an effort 
to qualitatively identify the costs and benefits of a minimum-
capital-adequacy regulation, it did not quantitatively estimate 
any of the benefits or the relevant costs. 
In 1989, the regulators introduced risk-based capital rules 
in the wake of Basel I. The purpose of these standards was to 
provide a more accurate assessment of bank health by reward-
ing banks with low-risk assets. The regulations also attempted 
to take account of off–balance sheet liabilities.107 The regulators 
 
 102 Comptroller of the Currency, Minimum Capital Ratios; Issuance of Directives, 50 
Fed Reg 10207, 10208 (1985): 
[A]pproximately 95% of all national banks had a primary capital ratio in excess 
of 6%, a level which would exceed the primary capital requirement established 
by this regulation. In addition, most of the larger multinational and regional 
banks (which generally have lower capital ratios than smaller banks) had pri-
mary and total capital ratios which would exceed the minimum requirements. 
 103 See id at 10215. 
 104 See id. 
 105 Id. 
 106 See 50 Fed Reg at 10215 (cited in note 102). 
 107 See 54 Fed Reg at 4186 (cited in note 72). 
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did not mention any concerns about existing capital levels; their 
goal was to provide a more appropriate measure of financial sol-
vency rather than to strengthen standards. The OCC did not 
conduct a cost-benefit analysis, because it did not believe that 
the rule was a “major rule”—that is, a rule creating costs of $100 
million or more per year.108 It did not explain why it came to this 
conclusion, but the most likely reason is that it believed that the 
rule created net benefits for banks by releasing them from exces-
sively rigid capital-adequacy regulations. The Fed and the FDIC 
noted that while the regulation would impose some new reporting 
requirements, it would not require banks to raise capital.109 
Similarly, in 2007 the regulators adjusted the risk-based 
rules by allowing a subset of banks to use internal valuation 
methods to determine the appropriate capital–asset ratios in 
light of the credit risks of their loans, but they did not intend to 
strengthen these rules.110 In a joint statement, the regulators 
discussed the costs and benefits of the new rules. The regulators 
estimated a total cost of $489.9 million for implementing the 
new rules—including expenses by regulators as well as by 
banks.111 This amount of money is pocket change for the banking 
industry and does not reflect the major impact of capital regula-
tion, which, by putting a limit on lending, reduces profits.112 It 
may have been the case that the regulators did not expect the 
2007 regulations to reduce profits but instead expected them to 
increase profits by liberating banks from the arbitrary rules 
then in effect.113 If so, however, the regulators did not quantify 
this benefit. The regulators listed other benefits without quanti-
fying them, including better capital allocation, reduction of 
 
 108 54 Fed Reg at 4177 (cited in note 72). 
 109 54 Fed Reg at 4197 (cited in note 72); 54 Fed Reg at 11509 (cited in note 72). 
 110 See 72 Fed Reg at 69295 (cited in note 81). 
 111 Id at 69393. 
 112 See Shekhar Aiyar, Charles W. Calomiris, and Tomasz Wieladek, Does Macro-
Pru Leak? Evidence from a UK Policy Experiment *16–20 (NBER Working Paper Series, 
Feb 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/5P4R-NLXA (finding that regulated banks de-
crease lending in response to increased capital requirements). 
 113 One important aspect of this argument is that banks face competition from the 
shadow-banking system. See Malcolm Baker and Jeffrey Wurgler, Do Strict Capital Re-
quirements Raise the Cost of Capital? Banking Regulation and the Low Risk Anomaly 
*31 (NBER Working Paper Series, May 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/X8XV-YCBT 
(arguing that capital requirements do raise capital costs, which disadvantages regulated 
banks to the benefit of the shadow-banking system). 
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regulatory arbitrage, and better coordination across countries, 
among others.114 
Finally, with the party over in 2013, the regulators raised 
capital-adequacy requirements. As the joint statement of the 
Fed and the OCC observed, “[T]he recent financial crisis 
demonstrated that the amount of high-quality capital held by 
banking organizations was insufficient to absorb the losses gen-
erated over that period.”115 The regulators do not appear to have 
conducted a formal cost-benefit analysis, but their joint state-
ment refers to, and appears to rely on, a pair of cost-benefit 
analyses that were conducted by the Basel Committee on Bank-
ing Supervision (BCBS),116 which I discuss later in this Section. 
Two passages in the joint statement are of interest. 
First, as before, the regulators observed that the new regu-
lations will not affect most banks: 
The agencies’ analysis also indicates that the overwhelming 
majority of banking organizations already have sufficient 
capital to comply with the final rule. In particular, the 
agencies estimate that over 95 percent of all insured deposi-
tory institutions would be in compliance with the minimums 
and buffers established under the final rule if it were fully 
effective immediately.117 
The FDIC made a similar statement.118 These statements are 
astonishing in light of the severity of the financial crisis and its 
effect on the economy. If banks were undercapitalized prior to 
2007–2008 and if their undercapitalization either caused or ex-
acerbated the financial crisis, as is widely believed,119 then how 
 
 114 See 72 Fed Reg at 69391 (cited in note 81). 
 115 78 Fed Reg at 62021 (cited in note 84). 
 116 See generally Macroeconomic Assessment Group, Final Report: Assessing the 
Macroeconomic Impact of the Transition to Stronger Capital and Liquidity Requirements 
(Bank for International Settlements, Dec 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/XC2S-4DNQ; 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, An Assessment of the Long-Term Economic 
Impact of Stronger Capital and Liquidity Requirements (Bank for International Settle-
ments, Aug 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/Y3E9-YXY5. 
 117 78 Fed Reg at 62026 (cited in note 84). 
 118 See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Regulatory Capital Rules: Regulato-
ry Capital, Implementation of Basel III, Capital Adequacy, Transition Provisions, 
Prompt Corrective Action, Standardized Approach for Risk-Weighted Assets, Market 
Discipline and Disclosure Requirements, Advanced Approaches Risk-Based Capital Rule, 
and Market Risk Capital Rule, 78 Fed Reg 55340, 55467 (2013). 
 119 See, for example, Admati and Hellwig, The Bankers’ New Clothes at 184–85 (cit-
ed in note 10); Federal Crisis Inquiry Commission, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report: 
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could it be the case that corrective regulations would affect hard-
ly any banks?120 
Second, the regulators noted that one of the major costs of 
the regulation is that when banks switch from debt to equity, 
they lose tax benefits.121 However, the loss of tax benefits is not a 
social cost that would be included in a cost-benefit analysis—
higher tax bills for the bank are just a transfer to the public. 
Thus, these tax costs are irrelevant. 
The BCBS produced a lengthy and sophisticated cost-benefit 
analysis that relied heavily on academic literature.122 The major 
benefit of capital-adequacy regulations is that they reduce the 
probability of a financial crisis. To calculate the probability of a 
financial crisis, the BCBS looked at historical data. A financial 
crisis occurs in a country once every twenty to twenty-five years, 
or with an average annual probability of 4.5 percent.123 When a 
banking crisis occurs, the economy typically goes into recession; 
thus, the major effect of a banking crisis is lost economic output. 
A comparison of studies indicates that the median loss is 63 per-
cent of gross domestic product (GDP).124 Using these figures, the 
BCBS calculated the expected social benefit from reducing the 
probability of a financial crisis by 1 percent as approximately 0.2 
percent of GDP per year.125 The BCBS also estimated the effect 
of a change in capital requirements on the probability of a crisis. 
The probability and severity of a financial crisis decline at a de-
creasing rate as bank capitalization increases.126  
The major cost of capital-adequacy regulations is the con-
straint on banks’ flexibility in choosing financing arrangements 
that maximize profits. If banks must maintain certain capital–
 
Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic 
Crisis in the United States *230 (Jan 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/UYE7-AFUH. 
 120 A related puzzle is why banks have issued capital in excess of the required min-
imums. See Allen, Carletti, and Marquez, 24 Rev Fin Stud at 1006 (cited in note 13) (ar-
guing that bank competition leads banks to increase capital reserves above the required 
minimums). It is important to note, as Professor Franklin Allen and his coauthors have 
done, that issuing capital above the minimum requirements does not necessarily mean 
that the issuing banks are adequately capitalized. Id at 1008. 
 121 See 78 Fed Reg at 62153 (cited in note 84). 
 122 The BCBS’s analysis is divided into two documents. See generally MAG, Final 
Report (cited in note 116); BCBS, An Assessment of the Long-Term Economic Impact (cit-
ed in note 116). 
 123 See BCBS, An Assessment of the Long-Term Economic Impact at *9 (cited in 
note 116). 
 124 See id at *35. 
 125 Id at *13. 
 126 Id at *16. 
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asset ratios, then they cannot take on too much debt and must 
issue equity instead.127 The BCBS assumed that the cost is 
passed on to customers, who must pay higher interest rates for 
loans or borrow less money.128 Thus, the question is the economic 
impact of an increase in lending costs. With this information, 
the net benefits of different capital ratios can be estimated. Us-
ing various assumptions, the BCBS estimated optimal capital 
ratios in the range of 10 to 15 percent using a specific definition 
of capital that is not used by US regulators.129 Translated into 
US legal definitions, a midrange 12 percent ratio under the 
BCBS definitions implies a Tier 1–total assets ratio of 7.6 per-
cent, a Tier 1–risk-weighted assets ratio of 13.2 percent, and a 
total capital–risk-weighted assets ratio of 15.6 percent.130 
The BCBS report expressed a great deal of caution in its 
recommendations. Historical data on financial crises are sparse, 
and because economic conditions are always changing and dif-
ferent legal and economic systems prevail in different countries, 
there are limits to what one can extrapolate from those data.131 
Moreover, the BCBS could not quantify numerous costs and 
benefits—for example, the possibility that higher capital re-
quirements would reduce economic volatility. Academics have 
criticized the BCBS for making more-precise estimates of costs 
than were justified by existing studies132 and for assuming that 
the historical cost of raising equity under weak capital require-
ments provides an accurate basis for estimating the future cost 
if all banks were required to raise additional capital.133 Nonethe-
less, the BCBS study is significantly more illuminating and use-
ful than the published explanations that US regulators have 
produced. 
 
 127 Similarly, capital requirements reduce a bank’s ability to create liquidity. See 
Skander J. Van den Heuvel, The Welfare Cost of Bank Capital Requirements, 55 J Mone-
tary Econ 298, 316 (2008). 
 128 The BCBS also includes in the cost-benefit analysis the effect of the increased 
liquidity requirements in Basel III. See BCBS, An Assessment of the Long-Term Econom-
ic Impact at *3 (cited in note 116) (“Although there is considerable uncertainty about the 
exact magnitude of the effect, the evidence suggests that higher capital and liquidity re-
quirements can significantly reduce the probability of banking crises.”). 
 129 See id at *29.  
 130 See id at *57. 
 131 For a discussion and critique of these data, see Coates, 124 Yale L J at 960–74 
(cited in note 11). 
 132 See, for example, id. 
 133 See, for example, Admati, et al, Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths at *54–55 
(cited in note 34). 
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The BCBS ratios are considerably higher than the final 
Basel III rules,134 which are being phased in by US regulators.135 
Recall that the Tier 1 ratio was only 6 percent (rather than the 
BCBS’s 13.2 percent) and that the total ratio was only 8 percent 
(rather than the BCBS’s 15.6 percent). Part of the explanation 
for the difference is that US regulators chose to incorporate part 
of the capital ratio in the form of capital-buffer requirements, 
which effectively raise all the minimums by 2.5 percentage 
points.136 An additional surcharge of up to 2.5 percentage points 
for global systemically important institutions further increases the 
ratios for those institutions.137 Other differences may be due to dif-
ferent definitions; however, I have not found a clear explanation.138 
B. Lessons 
Regulators raised capital requirements slowly and reluc-
tantly from 1981 to 2013, while at the same time increasing 
their complexity. The increase in complexity was clearly a re-
sponse to the problem of regulatory arbitrage. Crude bright-line 
rules are easy to administer but invite evasion, resulting in 
banks that are excessively risky relative to the goals of those 
rules.139 The real puzzle is why the regulators did not increase 
capital regulations more aggressively.140 
To see why this is a puzzle, recall that as a matter of theory, 
capital regulations should constrain banks’ behavior because, in 
 
 134 It is not clear why the final Basel III rules are less demanding than the ratios 
recommended by the BCBS’s cost-benefit analysis. See Ranjit Lall, From Failure to Fail-
ure: The Politics of International Banking Regulation, 19 Rev Intl Polit Econ 609, 626–
32 (2011). 
 135 Id. 
 136 See 78 Fed Reg at 62033 (cited in note 84). 
 137 For a list of global systemically important institutions, see Update of Group of 
Global Systemically Important Banks at *3 (cited in note 86).  
 138 As discussed by Sir Paul Tucker, former Deputy Governor of the Bank of England 
for Financial Stability, the cumulative effect of these requirements, taking into account 
the various loopholes in Basel I, was to increase capital requirements for global systemi-
cally important institutions by as much as ten times. See Paul Tucker, Capital Regula-
tion in the New World: The Political Economy of Regime Change *1–3 (unpublished 
manuscript, Aug 1, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/CHV5-EEHQ. 
 139 See generally Prasad Krishnamurthy, Rules, Standards, and Complexity in Cap-
ital Regulation, 43 J Legal Stud S273 (2014). See also Ran Duchin and Denis Sosyura, 
Safer Ratios, Riskier Portfolios: Banks’ Response to Government Aid, 113 J Fin Econ 1, 
9–12 (2014) (finding that banks receiving government support tend to shift toward riski-
er assets within the same asset class). 
 140 One response from the regulators might be that while ratios have not increased 
drastically, the definitions of Tier 1 and equity capital have become stricter. See Martin 
Feldstein, What Powers for the Federal Reserve?, 48 J Econ Lit 134, 142 (2010). 
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the absence of regulation, banks maximize profits by making 
loans and investments that are riskier than what is socially op-
timal. These incentives are possessed by all banks, including the 
best-managed ones and not only poorly managed or marginal 
banks. Moreover, the magnitude of this effect is significant. The 
BCBS’s cost-benefit analysis suggests that optimal capital ratios 
are significantly higher than those implemented by regulators.141 
Academics have conducted their own cost-benefit analyses, and 
an emerging consensus indicates that optimal capital rules may 
be even stricter than those recommended by the BCBS.142 
Yet US regulators took pains, even as late as 2013, to argue 
that their regulations would affect very few banks—only the bot-
tom 5 percent or so. Historical data bear out this claim. Empiri-
cal studies show that US capital-adequacy rules have not affect-
ed the capital–asset ratios of banks.143 The ratios in those rules 
were too low, or the rules were too easy to arbitrage. Many 
banks did increase their capital–asset ratios at various times—
for example in the 1990s—but this was in response to market 
forces, not to capital-adequacy rules.144 The capital-adequacy 
rules were like speed limits of two hundred miles per hour that 
no one exceeds because their cars cannot drive that fast. 
As noted above, the introduction of risk weighting was ap-
parently motivated by worries that unweighted capital–asset 
rules were excessively crude and invited arbitrage. But risk 
weighting was itself a crude response to this problem. As Profes-
sor Prasad Krishnamurthy shows, it would have been possible 
for regulators to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of risk 
weighting.145 If they had, they might well have decided to forgo it 
because of the equivocal evidence of its effect on the financial 
 
 141 See text accompanying notes 134–38. 
 142 See notes 34–35; Prasad Krishnamurthy, Regulating Capital, 4 Harv Bus L Rev 
1, 7–8 (2014). 
 143 See, for example, Reint Gropp and Florian Heider, The Determinants of Bank 
Capital Structure, 14 Rev Fin 587, 590 (2010) (noting that capital regulation did not af-
fect capital–asset ratios in the 1990s or early 2000s); Mark J. Flannery and Kasturi P. 
Rangan, What Caused the Bank Capital Build-Up of the 1990s?, 12 Rev Fin 391, 420–23 
(2008) (finding no statistically significant relationship between capital rules and capital–
asset ratios of bank holding companies in the 1980s or 1990s). These articles cite an ex-
tensive literature on this topic. See, for example, Tarullo, Banking on Basel at 141–42 
(cited in note 48). There is also an extensive literature on why market forces cause banks 
to issue capital beyond regulatory limits. See generally, for example, Allen, Carletti, and 
Marquez, 24 Rev Fin Stud 983 (cited in note 13). 
 144 See Allen, Carletti, and Marquez, 24 Rev Fin Stud at 984 (cited in note 13). 
 145 See Krishnamurthy, 43 J Legal Stud at S288–92 (cited in note 139). 
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health of banks. Yet they did not engage in rigorous cost-benefit 
analysis, and they effectively weakened capital requirements by 
enabling banks to classify high-risk assets as low risk.146 
All of this suggests that if regulators had used cost-benefit 
analysis, they would have produced stricter capital-adequacy 
rules, which would have caused banks to raise capital–asset ra-
tios. Because inadequate capitalization contributed to the 2007–
2008 financial crisis,147 the failure to use cost-benefit analysis 
probably increased the severity of that crisis.148 Hence, contrary 
to the usual charge that cost-benefit analysis blocks regula-
tion,149 in the area of finance, cost-benefit analysis would have 
advanced regulation.150 
Why didn’t regulators use cost-benefit analysis? What were 
they doing instead? I now turn to these questions. 
IV.  NORMING AS A REGULATORY STRATEGY IN BANKING LAW 
A. Cost-Benefit Analysis, Feasibility Analysis, and Norming 
What is the explanation for the financial regulators’ choices 
of minimum capital levels? The regulators obviously believed 
that a relatively high capital–asset ratio is an important mark of 
the financial health of banks. This belief is at least plausible; 
most economists agree.151 But that is only the beginning of the 
inquiry. The next question is how to determine the right levels 
for capital-adequacy requirements. 
One hypothesis is that the regulators chose the socially op-
timal capital-adequacy requirements in light of the information 
available at the time, based on formal cost-benefit analyses or at 
least on informal cost-benefit reasoning. As we have seen, the 
OCC produced some cost-benefit analyses, the other regulators 
 
 146 See Admati and Hellwig, The Bankers’ New Clothes at 183–87 (cited in note 10). 
 147 See id at 184–85; FCIC, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report at *230 (cited in 
note 119). 
 148 Another contributing factor could be that bank regulation, split among three 
main agencies in the United States, is too fragmented. See Kenneth R. French, et al, The 
Squam Lake Report: Fixing the Financial System 15 (Princeton 2010). 
 149 See, for example, Ackerman and Heinzerling, Priceless at 35–40 (cited in 
note 12); McGarity, Freedom to Harm at 77–78, 273–74 (cited in note 12). 
 150 An alternative hypothesis is simply that regulators believed that other pruden-
tial tools at their disposal were sufficient to deter bank runs and that they therefore delib-
erately chose low minimum-capital rules because they did not believe that high minimum-
capital rules were necessary. 
 151 See, for example, Admati and Hellwig, The Bankers’ New Clothes at 94–99 (cited 
in note 10). 
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discussed costs and benefits, and the BCBS produced a cost-
benefit analysis for the capital-adequacy rules in Basel III. But 
it is doubtful that these cost-benefit analyses determined the 
capital-adequacy rules that were ultimately issued. The cost-
benefit analyses produced by the regulators were informal, ad-
dressed the wrong costs, and did not quantify the benefits—and, 
in any event, did not appear to be done in a rigorous fashion and 
so could not justify a specific ratio. The first high-quality cost-
benefit analysis was the BCBS’s, which, however, was not ex-
plicitly adopted by US regulators. It is possible that US regula-
tors engaged in formal or informal cost-benefit analysis behind 
the scenes—but that seems highly unlikely, given the woefully 
inadequate levels that the regulators chose before 2013. 
Regulators may also have believed that the risk of a syst-
emic crisis was essentially zero, thanks to advances in the intel-
lectual understanding of financial crises and in the operations of 
central banks. Thus, regulators did not bother to perform formal 
cost-benefit analyses, because they understood the benefit of 
capital regulation to be zero. However, this hypothesis is not 
consistent with regulators’ behavior. Why would regulators have 
intervened in the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management in 
1998152 if they believed that the cost of a crisis would have been 
zero? 
Yet another hypothesis is that minimum-capital regulations 
were chosen at the international level starting with Basel I; the 
domestic regulations that were examined above merely imple-
mented the Basel agreements. It would have made little sense to 
conduct cost-benefit analyses for domestic regulations that were 
predetermined by international bargaining. And yet this hy-
pothesis begs the question of how the international regulations 
were chosen. 
To understand the regulators’ behavior, we start with an 
observation that the regulations could be predicted directionally 
from data about bank weaknesses. The stricter rules in 1981, 
1985, and 2013 followed periods of financial instability. The 
rules of 1989 and 2007, which either relaxed or maintained 
standards, followed periods of financial health. The regulators 
acted like a person in a shower who turns the faucet toward hot 
if the water is too cold and toward cold if the water is too hot. 
 
 152 See Franklin R. Edwards, Hedge Funds and the Collapse of Long-Term Capital 
Management, 13 J Econ Persp 189, 200–04 (1999). 
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Still, we need to ask why the regulators raised or lowered 
capital levels as much (or as little) as they did. A major clue is 
the repeated insistence by the regulators that the new rules af-
fected hardly any banks. Changes would be made, but they 
would be small enough not to cause much harm to the industry. 
The only banks hurt by the regulations would be a handful of 
barely solvent banks, which would be forced to raise capital or 
else shut down.153 
This approach resembles feasibility analysis, another 
standard used by regulators to evaluate regulations. Under fea-
sibility analysis, the regulator chooses the strictest level of regu-
lation that is “feasible,” in the sense of not imposing excessive 
costs on the industry in terms of job loss, bankruptcy, and facto-
ry shutdowns.154 Feasibility analyses are often used in environ-
mental regulations, when the regulator imposes the strictest 
possible pollution controls that do not cause excessive harm to 
industry.155 In a typical feasibility analysis, the regulator de-
scribes the effects of the regulation and then justifies the regula-
tion by arguing that these harmful effects are small.156 
Feasibility analysis is not a rigorous style of evaluation. 
“Feasibility” is not defined; it is impossible to determine why one 
or two factory shutdowns are tolerable while four or five are not. 
Many commentators think that feasibility analysis favors regu-
latory aggressiveness.157 In environmental regulation, rules jus-
tified as “feasible” are often criticized on cost-benefit grounds.158 
In banking regulation, by contrast, this style of regulation is 
significantly less aggressive than what cost-benefit analysis im-
plies. For this reason, feasibility analysis seems not to be an apt de-
scription of the regulatory decision procedure. Instead, regulators 
 
 153 Another way of framing this criticism is that regulators adopt capital require-
ments in a microprudential way—in other words, that they aim to reduce individual 
bank failures rather than systemic costs. See Samuel G. Hanson, Anil K Kashyap, and 
Jeremy C. Stein, A Macroprudential Approach to Financial Regulation, 25 J Econ Persp 
3, 4–5 (2011). 
 154 See generally David M. Driesen, Two Cheers for Feasible Regulation: A Modest 
Response to Masur and Posner, 35 Harv Envir L Rev 313 (2011) (describing feasibility 
analysis). 
 155 See id at 314 (characterizing the feasibility principle as “the idea that adminis-
trative agencies should regulate serious health and environmental hazards as stringent-
ly as possible without causing widespread plant shutdowns”).  
 156 See Jonathan S. Masur and Eric A. Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U 
Chi L Rev 657, 675–80, 684–87 (2010). 
 157 See, for example, Driesen, 35 Harv Envir L Rev at 316–17 (cited in note 154) 
(providing a qualified defense of feasibility analysis). 
 158 See Masur and Posner, 77 U Chi L Rev at 687–712 (cited in note 156). 
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seem driven by a desire to inflict as little cost as possible on the 
industry—to mop up outliers, the riskiest banks, while leaving 
most banks unaffected.159 Moreover, regulations based on feasi-
bility analyses typically impose costs on all firms in the industry 
even if they bankrupt only a few. By contrast, banking regula-
tion imposes no costs (aside from reporting requirements) on all 
but the weakest firms in the industry. The banks at the middle 
or the high end of the normal distribution are unaffected; for 
that reason, I call this form of regulation “norming.” 
B. Is Norming a Justifiable Style of Financial Regulation? 
Is it possible that norming is the proper way to regulate the 
banking industry? There are strong reasons for doubt. As ex-
plained earlier, the government’s role in providing emergency 
liquidity gives all banks an incentive to maintain excessively 
risky portfolios.160 The proper regulatory response should be to 
reduce this perverse incentive. 
One could nonetheless imagine a justification for norming as 
a cautious, pragmatic form of regulation that may seem reason-
able in the face of great uncertainty.161 Suppose that financial 
regulators know that banks have excessive incentives to take 
risk, but that they do not know the magnitude of either those in-
centives or the risk. One possibility is that the risk of a financial 
crisis is small and, should a financial crisis occur, the economy 
would recover quickly. Another possibility is that the risk is very 
large. If the regulator does not know the magnitude of the risk, 
it has no basis for choosing a specific degree of regulatory strict-
ness. In addition, the regulator may fear unintended conse-
quences. For example, if it raises capital requirements by a large 
amount, banks will pay less for deposits—which may cause de-
positors to take their funds to money market mutual funds or 
 
 159 For an explanation and critique of bank regulators’ behavior, see Jeremy Bulow 
and Paul Klemperer, Market-Based Bank Capital Regulation *11–12 (unpublished man-
uscript, Sept 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/C33G-X6LD. 
 160 This has been framed as a time-inconsistency problem: because the government 
faces enormous political costs resulting from bank failures, even the toughest capital re-
quirements may be relaxed when a bank is at risk of failure. See Oliver Hart and Luigi 
Zingales, A New Capital Regulation for Large Financial Institutions, 13 Am L & Econ 
Rev 453, 482–84 (2011). 
 161 On this topic, see generally Adrian Vermeule, Rationally Arbitrary Decisions (in 
Administrative Law) (Harvard Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper 
Series), archived at http://perma.cc/8JC9-QUYN; Cass R. Sunstein, The Limits of Quan-
tification, 102 Cal L Rev 1369 (2014). 
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elsewhere, precipitating a crisis or creating general economic 
dislocations that are hard to predict.162 
Regulators may therefore adopt a cautious ratcheting strat-
egy in which they raise capital regulations a small amount and 
then see what happens. If capital flees from banks, they will 
learn that the unintended consequences are more severe than 
they anticipated, and they can retreat. If it does not, they will 
learn that perhaps those consequences may be safely ignored, 
and they can then make plans to further increase the strictness 
of the regulations. Meanwhile, the regulations will also have 
some direct beneficial effects, as they will force the weakest 
banks to raise capital or else shut down. This approach has an 
experimental feel. In a climate of extreme uncertainty, it may be 
justified to engage in small steps and see what the market reac-
tion is. This will create additional information that will reduce 
some uncertainty and provide the basis for additional regulation 
if necessary.163 The small-step approach also helps address the 
often-exaggerated but politically effective claims of regulated 
parties that even a little bit of regulation will destroy thousands 
of jobs or the economy itself.164 
A further consideration is that banking regulators are re-
sponsible for the health of the banking system, while, say, envi-
ronmental regulators are not responsible for the financial health 
of the industries that they regulate. When a banking regulator 
raises capital requirements, it takes a risk that it will force 
banks to shut down and that it will then be responsible for en-
suring that those bank shutdowns do not cause panic or conta-
gion. When an environmental regulation drives a firm into 
bankruptcy, the EPA has no specific obligations toward that 
firm, its shareholders, or its creditors. Thus, banking regulators 
may have stronger incentives to issue regulations that leave 
most firms unaffected. 
 
 162 There is cause for regulators to worry about high capital requirements funneling 
investments to the shadow-banking system. See Milton Harris, Christian C. Opp, and 
Marcus M. Opp, Higher Capital Requirements, Safer Banks? Macroprudential Regula-
tion in a Competitive Financial System *32–33 (unpublished manuscript, Mar 21, 2014), 
archived at http://perma.cc/343X-HP46 (discussing the relationship between capital reg-
ulations and competition from other investors, such as shadow banks). 
 163 See generally Matthew Spitzer and Eric Talley, On Experimentation and Real 
Options in Financial Regulation, 42 J Legal Stud S121 (2014). 
 164 See, for example, Editorial, They Keep Fighting Back (NY Times, Feb 2, 2012), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/BR7T-57BY (discussing banks’ resistance to capital regulations). 
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Norming may well be justified in a range of regulatory set-
tings. Consider, for example, the regulation of a new industry, 
like the commercial-space-travel industry. Regulators are likely 
concerned about the safety of new spaceships, but at the same 
time they lack sufficient data to estimate the effectiveness of ex-
pensive safety features.165 Thus, regulators cannot use cost-
benefit analysis to determine whether specific safety features 
should be mandatory. As an alternative approach, regulators 
could wait to see how different commercial-space-travel compa-
nies perform and then require the firms that experience the 
most accidents to adopt the precautions and safety standards of 
the firms that experience the fewest accidents. It seems likely 
that aviation- and automobile-safety regulators have taken simi-
lar approaches. 
Banking regulation is different because decades of experi-
ence with banking—and piles of data—provide the basis for cost-
benefit analysis. Because of the rarity and severity of financial 
crises, little will be learned from raising standards incremental-
ly and then waiting to see what happens. If no financial crisis 
takes place, nothing will be learned. If a financial crisis does 
take place, then significant harm will have occurred. Moreover, 
data on financial institutions are plentiful and thus make possi-
ble reasonable predictions about the effects of regulations on the 
financial system.166 
C. A Political Theory of Norming 
The political economy of banking regulation has received a 
great deal of attention. In a recent book, Professors Charles 
Calomiris and Stephen Haber argue that the US banking sys-
tem is, and has been, fragile because of the role of interest 
groups in constructing the state and federal legal systems.167 In 
the nineteenth century and much of the twentieth century, 
small state banks formed a political alliance with populist inter-
ests that feared that large financial institutions would use their 
economic powers to harm Southern and Western farmers.168 
This alliance resisted sporadic efforts to permit banks to merge 
and grow, enabling small banks to maintain monopoly power in 
 
 165 See Ledyard King, Panel Says It Can’t Confirm Commercial Crew Meets Safety 
Standards (USA Today, Feb 28, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/JM24-NLLP. 
 166 See Posner and Weyl, 124 Yale L J F at 248–50 (cited in note 11). 
 167 See generally Calomiris and Haber, Fragile by Design (cited in note 51). 
 168 Id at 158. 
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their markets.169 After urbanization and technological develop-
ment weakened the ability of small banks to earn monopoly 
rents in the 1980s and 1990s, consolidation took place, resulting 
in the much-feared political domination of large banks and fi-
nancial conglomerates, which formed alliances with urban activ-
ists who sought cheaper credit for low-income people.170 The re-
sult was deregulation, the erosion of underwriting standards, 
and ultimately the financial crisis of 2007–2008.171 
Many other scholars agree that the banking industry played 
a significant role in pushing for deregulation, which took place 
at both the legislative and agency levels.172 Congress passed 
numerous statutes that weakened the rules. These statutes in-
cluded the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary 
Control Act of 1980,173 which phased out interest-rate ceilings on 
deposits; the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Ef-
ficiency Act of 1994,174 which abolished many restrictions on in-
terstate banking; and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,175 which 
eroded the Glass-Steagall wall between commercial and invest-
ment banking. During this entire period, going as far back as 
the 1960s, the individual banking regulators also increasingly 
allowed banks to enter new markets, based on broad interpreta-
tions of the law.176 
 
 169 Id at 158–83. 
 170 Id at 208–13. 
 171 See Calomiris and Haber, Fragile by Design at 203–13 (cited in note 51). 
 172 For discussions of the political economy of banking regulation, see generally, for 
example, id; Randall S. Kroszner and Philip E. Strahan, Regulation and Deregulation of 
the US Banking Industry: Causes, Consequences, and Implications for the Future, in 
Nancy L. Rose, ed, Economic Regulation and Its Reform: What Have We Learned? 485 
(Chicago 2014) (emphasizing interest group competition between proregulation small 
banks and antiregulation big banks); James Livingston, Origins of the Federal Reserve 
System: Money, Class, and Corporate Capitalism, 1890–1913 (Cornell 1986) (emphasiz-
ing the populist distrust of banking); Barth, Caprio, and Levine, Guardians of Finance 
(cited in note 40) (arguing that the regulatory breakdown that led to the financial crisis 
was caused by ideology, influence of the financial industry, psychological biases of regu-
lators, and opacity of regulation); Simon Johnson and James Kwak, 13 Bankers: The 
Wall Street Takeover and the Next Financial Meltdown (Pantheon 2011) (discussing the 
political economy causes of the financial crisis).  
 173 Pub L No 96-221, 94 Stat 132, codified as amended in Titles 12 and 15. 
 174 Pub L No 103-328, 108 Stat 2338, codified as amended in various sections of Ti-
tles 7, 12, and 31. 
 175 Pub L No 106-102, 113 Stat 1338 (1999). 
 176 See, for example, NationsBank of North Carolina, N.A. v Variable Annuity Life 
Insurance Co, 513 US 251, 264 (1995) (approving the OCC’s decision to permit banks to 
act as agents in the sales of annuities); Securities Industry Association v Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System, 807 F2d 1052, 1069–70 (DC Cir 1986) (approving the 
Fed’s decision to permit banks to engage in private placements of commercial paper). 
02 POSNER_ART_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/12/2015  2:30 PM 
2015] Capital-Adequacy Requirements 1889 
 
There is little doubt that banks also pressured regulators to 
reduce—or not to increase too much—the capital require-
ments.177 Yet banking regulators were also under political pres-
sure to increase capital requirements. As we saw, the decline in 
the capital levels of banks in the 1970s, accompanied by bank 
failures, both led regulators to increase capital-adequacy re-
quirements in 1981 and induced Congress to urge regulators 
forward in 1983.178 The savings and loan (S&L) crisis in the 
1980s further illustrated the dangers of undercapitalized 
banks.179 
Norming as a decision procedure can be seen as a way of re-
sponding to these contradictory pressures. Imagine that a regu-
lator wants to avoid criticism for failing to regulate and criticism 
for regulating too strictly. The criticism for regulating too strictly 
comes from industry, which directly bears the costs of regula-
tion. The criticism for failing to regulate may come from public-
interest groups or from industries that compete with the regu-
lated industry. Congress may also criticize a regulator for failing 
to regulate strictly when the law calls for strict regulation,180 but 
Congress has diverse constituencies, and both the regulated in-
dustry and the beneficiaries from regulation will be able to in-
fluence it. 
These competing pressures could, in some cases, result in 
significant levels of regulation, as is illustrated by environmen-
tal regulation. Polluting industries fight against environmental 
regulations because those regulations increase their costs of 
business. But public-interest groups like the Sierra Club urge 
regulators to regulate strictly. A regulator may try to optimize 
among these competing pressures. Many environmental regula-
tions are fairly strict, perhaps reflecting that public-interest 
groups can mobilize public pressure by bringing to the public’s 
 
 177 See Johnson and Kwak, 13 Bankers at 200 (cited in note 172) (discussing the in-
fluence of banks on regulators); Calomiris and Haber, Fragile by Design at 263–66 (cited 
in note 51) (same). For a discussion of banks’ impact on the Basel process, see Lall, 19 
Rev Intl Polit Econ at 610 (cited in note 134) (arguing that large banks had a significant 
influence on negotiations, which led to a weakening of standards). 
 178 See text accompanying notes 57–66. 
 179 See generally Joe Peek and Eric S. Rosengren, How Well Capitalized Are Well-
Capitalized Banks?, 1997 New Eng Econ Rev 41 (Sept/Oct 1997). 
 180 See, for example, Edward Markey, Disappointing Ozone Decision Puts Pressure 
on Obama on Other Clean Air, Water Rules (Sept 2, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc 
/97YU-464P (“I am disappointed that the President chose to further delay important 
clean air protections that would have helped to prevent respiratory and cardiac disease 
in thousands of Americans.”). 
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attention the harmful effects of pollution on people’s health and 
well-being. 
In the area of financial regulation, public-interest groups 
seem considerably weaker. It is plausible (though hard to 
demonstrate) that the public feels less strongly about financial 
regulation than about environmental regulation.181 The benefi-
cial effects of capital-adequacy regulation are far more obscure 
than the beneficial effects of regulations that reduce the amount 
of arsenic in water supplies.182 Thus, if financial regulation is in-
adequate, it will be difficult for public-interest groups to mobi-
lize public pressure.183 Indeed, while we are all familiar with the 
major environmental groups like the Sierra Club and Green-
peace, it is hard to think of the names of the groups that seek 
greater financial regulation.184 They have a blurrier public pro-
file, because the public is less interested in financial regulation 
than in environmental regulation and has a weaker understand-
ing of financial regulation than of environmental regulation. 
Consider, for example, the difference between the public re-
action to climate change and the public reaction to the financial 
crisis. While not everyone believes that climate change is taking 
place, it has remained in the news continuously—whenever the 
weather is bad, or a natural disaster occurs, or a new study is 
released. By contrast, the financial crisis generated the Occupy 
Wall Street movement, which grabbed public attention for about 
a year and then petered out long before banking regulators had 
completed the hundreds of new regulations authorized by the 
Dodd-Frank Act.185 Economic recovery seems to quell outrage 
about financial crises, while concerns about the quality of the 
environment persist over booms and busts. 
There are many other differences between environmental 
regulation and financial regulation. One is that pollution is often 
a continuous problem. If smog envelops a town, everyone sees 
(and smells) it. Financial crises, by contrast, are sporadic. Twenty 
 
 181 See Jonathan R. Macey, The Political Science of Regulating Bank Risk, 49 Ohio 
St L J 1277, 1287–88 (1989) (describing and citing literature on this variation in public 
opinion). 
 182 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90 Georgetown L J 2255, 2256 
(2002) (describing the EPA’s use of cost-benefit analysis to evaluate arsenic regulations). 
 183 See Atif Mian, Amir Sufi, and Francesco Trebbi, Resolving Debt Overhang: Politi-
cal Constraints in the Aftermath of Financial Crises, 6 Am Econ J: Macroecon 1, 26 (2014). 
 184 See Macey, 49 Ohio St L J at 1288–90 (cited in note 181). 
 185 This observation is based on a search in Google Trends for the terms “Occupy Wall 
Street” and “climate change.” See Google Trends, archived at http://perma.cc/69KY-VMV5. 
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years separated the S&L crisis of the 1980s and the financial 
crisis of 2007–2008. The financial industry can resist regulation 
by using a strategy of delay in the immediate aftermath of the 
crisis until public attention has wandered. Polluting industries 
have no such strategy. 
Another difference is that financial regulation is a global 
matter while environmental regulation is usually a national 
one.186 It is much easier to move money overseas than to move 
plants and equipment overseas; accordingly, excessive financial 
regulation can lead to capital flight while excessive environmen-
tal regulation will have a more limited effect on the regulated 
industries. In such circumstances, a certain amount of regulato-
ry conservatism (as reflected in the norming approach) is easy to 
understand, even if it is not necessarily optimal. 
Note also that major financial institutions gain from regula-
tion to the extent that it reduces competition from marginal in-
stitutions. Thus, major players in the financial industry may 
well be willing to support stricter capital-adequacy regulations 
that eliminate competition from the marginal enterprises that 
can undercut them on prices. Indeed, to the extent that weak 
banks can spark panic and contagion, major banks will benefit 
from rules that regulate the weak banks out of existence. It may 
well be the case that norming will be attractive to an agency 
that is captured by an industry. The industry uses the agency to 
eliminate outliers; the agency’s regulatory efforts are then seen 
by an uninformed public (to the extent that it is paying attention 
at all) as evidence that the agency is not excessively passive. A 
similar argument has been made about licensing requirements, 
which are sometimes seen as devices used by an industry that has 
captured legislators or regulators to raise the costs of entry beyond 
what is justified by legitimate health and safety considerations.187 
The interest group pressures that cause banking regulation 
to deviate from the social optimum are complicated, and a large 
literature already identifies many ways that those pressures 
may influence specific policies, such as chartering requirements, 
 
 186 There are a few exceptions to this generalization, including the regulation of 
chlorofluorocarbon and carbon emissions. See Cass R. Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto: 
A Tale of Two Protocols, 31 Harv Envir L Rev 1, 2 (2007) (describing treaty negotiations 
to address two major international environmental problems—the ozone hole and climate 
change). 
 187 See Harold Demsetz, Barriers to Entry, 72 Am Econ Rev 47, 48 (1982) (arguing 
that incumbent firms may support regulations that raise the costs of entry for potential 
competitors). 
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capital levels, and so on.188 The argument I advance here is that 
those pressures may also affect a regulator’s choice of decision 
procedure or methodology for evaluating regulations. Norming 
will appeal to any regulator that faces strong headwinds from 
interest groups—because it encourages limited regulation that 
benefits most firms while harming only outliers—and that also 
wants to be seen as doing something to avoid offending Congress 
and the public. 
By contrast, cost-benefit analysis is not the sort of method-
ology that would normally be adopted by regulators that are 
subject to interest group pressures. The methodology does not 
lend itself to deals among interest groups, because it forces regu-
lators to take into account the effects of regulations on unor-
ganized consumers. Thus, cost-benefit analysis has rarely been 
used by regulators at their own initiative. Instead, it was forced 
on them by the White House starting in 1981 with Executive 
Order 12291. 
One of the virtues of cost-benefit analysis is that it provides 
intellectual resources for resisting political pressures. If bank 
regulators had used cost-benefit analysis to evaluate capital 
regulations, they might have been able to resist some of the 
pressures brought against them.189 One might argue that if regu-
lators had been captured by industry, they would simply have 
manipulated the cost-benefit analysis. But a manipulated cost-
benefit analysis is a bad cost-benefit analysis, and evidence of 
such manipulation could have been used by forces hostile to de-
regulation to counter the pressure of the banks. It is also not 
clear that bank regulators were really captured. They may well 
have been influenced by ideological currents of the time that 
 
 188 See, for example, Macey, 49 Ohio St L J at 1278 (cited in note 181). 
 189 Regulators might also not have been able to resist such pressures. It is important 
to recognize that there was a great deal of controversy over what the optimal capital 
regulations would be. Many economists believed that, for example, the Basel II rules 
were too strict or too rigid. See generally, for example, Anil K Kashyap and Jeremy C. 
Stein, Cyclical Implications of the Basel II Capital Standards, 28 Econ Persp 18 (2004) 
(arguing that Basel II should have provided for lower standards during recessions so as 
to avoid exacerbating cyclical downturns); Joe Peek and Eric Rosengren, Bank Regula-
tion and the Credit Crunch, 19 J Bank & Fin 679 (1995) (arguing that the enforcement of 
capital requirements caused credit shrinkage in New England). However, I have not 
found contemporary papers summarizing formal cost-benefit analyses of capital–asset 
ratios, as opposed to pointing out various isolated empirical effects of those rules. 
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favored deregulation. But even deregulators can be influenced 
by cost-benefit analysis when the results are compelling.190 
CONCLUSION 
It is by now well-known that the government underregulat-
ed the financial industry from the 1980s until the 2007–2008 fi-
nancial crisis and that this underregulation contributed to that 
crisis. The deregulation of the financial industry had complex 
roots. Banks were overregulated in the post–World War II peri-
od, which made it difficult for them to survive the economic 
stresses of the 1970s. Many of the rules—such as restrictions on 
branching—made little sense from the standpoint of the public 
interest, and it was reasonable to abolish them. Yet no one be-
lieved that banks should be completely deregulated. Regulators 
retained their legal authority to regulate banks for safety and 
soundness, and several statutes enacted in the 1980s encour-
aged them to do so. 
Basic economic principles indicated that banks would take 
excessive risks unless regulated. Indeed, the S&L crisis of the 
1980s was a textbook illustration of the economic consequences 
of insufficient financial regulation,191 and Congress responded in 
1989 by ordering regulators to tighten the rules.192 Thus, eco-
nomic principles and statutory mandates should have equipped 
regulators with justifications for relatively strict capital rules.193 
Yet regulators did not issue strict capital regulations. Instead, 
they adopted a strategy of norming, which ensured that the 
rules did no more than weed out a handful of outliers. 
The explanation for this behavior may be that regulatory 
zeal simply crumbled in the face of industry opposition. But an-
other hypothesis is that regulators lacked an adequate decision 
procedure that would have enabled them to see that the industry’s 
 
 190 A frequently cited example is the Reagan administration’s decision to support an 
ozone treaty after being presented with a cost-benefit analysis that showed both that the 
ozone hole produced huge costs and that regulations that would ameliorate the problem 
would impose relatively low costs on industry. See Sunstein, 31 Harv Envir L Rev at 15 
(cited in note 186). 
 191 See generally Edward J. Kane, The S&L Insurance Mess: How Did It Happen? 
(Urban Institute 1989) (describing the regulatory failures that led to the S&L crisis). 
 192 See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub 
L No 101-73, 103 Stat 183. 
 193 By contrast, the academic literature overwhelmingly criticized bank regulations 
for encouraging banks to engage in excessive risk taking. See, for example, Macey, 49 
Ohio St L J at 1277–78 & n 8 (cited in note 181). 
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demands were unreasonable. We cannot rerun history and see 
what would have happened if regulators had been required to 
use cost-benefit analysis. It is possible that each regulator would 
have conducted phony cost-benefit analyses (as the OCC did) 
and that the same outcomes would have occurred. Critics of cost-
benefit analysis worry that this decision procedure encourages 
regulators to ignore the intangible, hard-to-value benefits of a 
regulation.194 In the area of financial regulation, the statistical 
value of an avoided financial crisis may have been regarded as 
too hard to determine. 
But even if this criticism is valid for environmental regula-
tion, it is hard to imagine that something similar could happen 
in financial regulation. In the case of environmental regulation, 
the EPA typically does value the major hard-to-measure benefits 
of regulation—namely, avoided statistical deaths.195 It ignores 
certain other, even-harder-to-measure benefits like the abstract 
value of the continuing existence of wilderness, and it also ig-
nores mild harms like headaches.196 Cost-benefit analyses may 
therefore understate benefits, but likely not by much. By con-
trast, if financial regulators ignored the benefits of reducing the 
probability of a financial crisis, there would be virtually no bene-
fit to financial regulation—and capital requirements would be 
reduced to zero. No one believes that this is the right outcome. A 
cost-benefit-analysis requirement would thus compel regulators 
to undertake this difficult but not impossible valuation exercise, 
rather than to ignore it.197 
The history of capital regulation also contains larger lessons 
for the regulatory state. Norming and its cousin, feasibility 
analysis, lend themselves to underregulation when the regulator 
faces determined opposition from industry. Norming may make 
sense in certain industries, particularly those in which rapid 
technological development keeps regulators guessing about the 
social costs and benefits of the regulated activity. Regulators 
may reasonably permit different firms to take different levels of 
 
 194 See Ackerman and Heinzerling, Priceless at 200 (cited in note 12). 
 195 See Lisa A. Robinson, How US Government Agencies Value Mortality Risk Re-
ductions, 1 Rev Envir Econ & Pol 283, 283–85 (2007). 
 196 For a discussion of the problem of measuring these kinds of harms, see Matthew D. 
Adler and Eric A. Posner, New Foundations of Cost-Benefit Analysis 126–27 (Harvard 2006). 
 197 This is not to say that judicial enforcement of cost-benefit analysis would have 
been justified. On the question of institutional enforcement, see generally Robert P. 
Bartlett III, The Institutional Framework for Cost-Benefit Analysis in Financial Regula-
tion: A Tale of Four Paradigms?, 43 J Legal Stud S379 (2014). 
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precaution and then—only after observing the safety records of 
the different firms—require all firms to use the precautions of 
the average firm. The advantages and disadvantages of norming 
as a regulatory strategy in other industries may be an appropri-
ate topic for future research. 
But norming is not the correct regulatory strategy for bank-
ing regulation. It does not offer the intellectual resources for jus-
tifying socially beneficial regulations that impose large costs on 
the financial sector and thus for withstanding the pressures of 
the financial industry. Cost-benefit analysis for financial regula-
tion is overdue. 
